Thursday, September 26, 2019

"Taxes and Where to Find Them:” The battle of jurisdiction between Trump and New York


“Taxes and Where to Find Them:” The battle of jurisdiction between Trump and New York

          
        Since the presidential elections of 2016, there has been a constant debate on whether President Trump should release his tax returns.  Despite the fact that there is no federal law or requirement that binds a president from disclosing his federal taxes to the public, former presidents established such precedent and is now understood as a common practice. Recently New York has taken the lead by passing a law that allows the release of Donald Trump’s state tax returns[1], followed by Attorney General of New York[2] ordering this week a subpoena of his state tax returns. These actions have triggered a battle between Trump and the New York Attorney General (AG), with the former suing and setting the stage for a fight about jurisdiction.

           Ignoring the political aspects of the case, the most interesting piece, I argue, is the fight of jurisdiction on taking New York’s AG to court. Trump’s legal counsel is asking for the trial to be in Washington D.C., while the AG is looking for this lawsuit to be seen in a New York federal court.  The AG is arguing that D.C. does not have personal jurisdiction over them and that the long-arm statute of D.C. is not valid in this case as they don’t meet minimal contact with D.C. for federal courts there to take jurisdiction over them[3].  We are seeing an interesting argument being developed on whether a court in D.C. can take a case that involves a New York tax return and a New York law, and have it taken away from courts in New York. The reasoning of Trump’s legal team to bring the case to D.C., despite it appearing that all parties involved belong under New York jurisdiction, is that if his tax returns are released it would be to congress in D.C. 
Questions?
In Washington D.C. there is a long-arm statute that would allow those to become under personal jurisdiction if they are conducting any personal business in D.C.[4]  The question I ask of you is: do you believe that (ignoring everything else involved) the principle that an AG and a tax official can come under the personal jurisdiction of another court based on the idea that records would be sent to D.C. and that meets the long-arm statute? If so, what is your reasoning? If not, what would be the proper venue for a case such as this?

Thursday, September 12, 2019

“The Greatest Heist of Consumer Medical Records in History” and Article III Standing




News of data breaches and hacks has become common place and will likely increase in an age where digital information is amassed at an exponential rate [1].  Tech giants like Apple, Amazon, Google and Facebook partner with the healthcare industry to use personal data from fitness/health aps and sometimes medical records to create new technology.  In a nation that spends $3.5 trillion on healthcare annually [2], there is a huge market for business and healthcare providers see the value in tools that can increase the quality of life, better outcomes and help diagnosis and treat their patients.  However, use of this highly sensitive and most personal data presents ethical issues and legal challenges.   While the data continues to accumulate, the regulations and remedies for violations of privacy fall behind. 

Dinerstein v. Google and the University of Chicago

            This past June a class action was brought against Google and the University of Chicago on behalf of Matt Dinerstein for what the complaint describes as the “greatest heist of consumer medical records in history.”  In 2017, Google partnered with University of Chicago in a data analytics project.  Hundreds of thousands of records were released to Google to develop a machine learning model designed to predict and alert caregivers when a patient is declining.  Although data provided by the University of Chicago to Google was de-identified, the plaintiff argues that because Google “has untold amounts of data regarding consumers’ daily lives” and is “one of the largest and most comprehensive data mining companies in the world” sensitive and private health information could be linked back to the individual patient. [3]

Google and University of Chicago filed motions to dismiss the case with prejudice.  The defendants argue that the release of medical record information was allowed per research provisions of HIPAA regulations, but also that the plaintiff’s claim fails as there is no injury in fact.  While it may be possible for Google to reidentify individuals, they have not done so, nor do they plan to do so.  “Plaintiff has not alleged the required constitutional ‘injury-in-fact’ necessary to support Article III standing….even if Plaintiff satisfied Article III’s requirements, Plaintiff still fails to state any claim upon which relief may be granted.” [4]


Article III Standing and Privacy Rights

As discussed in class, a civil case does not have standing if there is no case or controversy.  To have Article III Standing the plaintiff is required to show:

1)     Injury in fact,
2)    Causation (the injury is linked to the defendant’s action); and
3)    Redressability (identify some form of relief that will alleviate the injury caused by the defendant) [5]

The “injury in fact” standard is hard-hitting when considering privacy rights.   The Supreme Court has said an “injury in fact” should be concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical (6).  It does not appear that Dinerstein v. Google would meet this standard.  Consider the sensitivity of genetic, mental health, and substance abuse information disclosed from medical records.  Inappropriate use and disclosure could limit an individual’s ability to obtain health or life insurance, and impact reputation, ability to obtain employment, and so forth.   Once private information is breached, it can’t be retrieved.  The consequences for an individual could be life altering.    

Questions

Is it reasonable that there is no civil remedy for privacy violations until injury actually occurs?  

Should the Supreme Court take a broader view of standing in consideration of privacy rights?


Sources:
3- Dinerstein v. Google, No. 1:19-CV-04311, 2019 WL 2627324 (N.D.Ill.) (Trial Pleading)
4- Dinerstein v. Google Case No1:19-CV-04311 – University of Chicago’s Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss
5- Manuet & Marcus, Pretrial,  68 (2015)
6- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
7- https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/technology/google-university-chicago-data-sharing-lawsuit.html 

WASHINGTON ALLIANCE OF TECHNOLOGY WORKERS V. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al,, 
AND NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURES, et al.

THE CASE

On October 25, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colombia will receive an amicus brief for this case. [8] The plaintiff is disputing international students (on F1 visas) participation in optional practical training (O.P.T.) after they graduate due to the "assertion that D.H.S. does not have statutory authority to create or maintain any kind of post-completion O.P.T.". [1] O.P.T. allows 24 months of work authorization after receiving a degree in the STEM fields, or 12 months for all other degree programs. The lawsuit has been an on-going battle with D.H.S. for 10 years. Due to policy changes in 2016, which increased work authorization from 17 to 24 months, it allowed WashTech to renew a case against the entirety of the O.P.T. program. [7] The dispute is over fear that “foreign students participating in the O.P.T. program reduce job opportunities for U.S. workers”. [2]

WHAT ARE THEY DISPUTING

WashTech is arguing that D.H.S. regulations in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(i) for admitting students into the U.S. have been ‘expanded’ and outside of their statutory authority. [12] WashTech claims that “this regulation expanded the statutory definition of student visa status by adding practical training. [1]

WHAT IS A CFR

However, “The Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) is the codification of the general and permanent rules published in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government.” which includes rules by D.H.S. in regards to F1 students [3] Specifically, 8 CFR 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(7) which describes the policies for O.P.T. [11] D.H.S. should be allowed to create regulations for O.P.T. since USCIS adjudicates the requests. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 backs this up since it’s “to improve the administration of justice by prescribing fair administrative procedure’; and by other laws…established a process for public participation in the rulemaking process by requiring executive agencies to issue proposed rules and take public comments, and, in most cases, delay the effective date for 30 days or more. Publishing in the Federal Register provides constructive notice of the rulemaking, the legal basis for the rulemaking, and changes made to the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) by the rule.” [4]

CONCLUSION

CFR’s take the vague U.S. Code Title 8 regulation and specifies in detail what F1 students can and can't do once they are admitted to the U.S. Since USCIS adjudicates on behalf of D.H.S. immigration changes for F1 visa students then it should be up to them to create regulations that coincide with the spirit of the F1 visa. This is an important case to follow as it additionally has economic consequences. [5][6]

QUESTIONS:

Should the University of Utah join this amicus brief? Particularly since they joined the amicus brief against the 2018 unlawful presence policy. [9] Why or why not?

If D.H.S. does not have statutory authority over specific details within the Code of Federal Regulations then who should have authority to create, monitor and regulate these laws for F1 visa holders?













[12] https://codes.findlaw.com/us/title-8-aliens-and-nationality/8-usc-sect-1101.html